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nonsite.org - Editorial - Issue #25
EVEN MORE NEOLIBERAL
ART HISTORY
GLOBALIZ ING ART HISTORY
CHARLES PALERMO
Anyone who’s been paying attention for the past two decades has
noticed that art history (just like the other humanities) has been
furiously globalizing itself.    From  ghting Eurocentrism to tracing
global networks of exchange, to acknowledging the
incommensurability of multiple modernities, to challenging the
category of art itself as an ideological mysti cation  developed  in
modern Europe—which continues to reproduce power structures
and to project them onto other cultures and peoples—turning global
is a move with a lot of sponsorship, both intellectual and
institutional.    These different attacks on an art history variously
understood as blinkered, racist or Eurocentric have been canonized
by art historians and, more importantly, by university
administrations.  Which is a good thing in lots of ways.  Departments
are adding full-time positions in areas they had previously left
untaught or had relied on adjuncts or other non-tenure-eligible
faculty to teach.
But there’s another side to this.  Globalizing art history also subserves
varieties of identity politics that are key tools of neoliberalism.
 Historically, so-called non-Western art has been underserved in art
history departments—or, what is worse, misrepresented.  The aim of
addressing historical inequalities typically takes as its goal a
redistribution of wealth or representation that undoes those historical
inequalities.    But, in the case of calls to address disparities in the
distribution of wealth among the members of various ascriptive
categories, this is a call to make the operations of the market fairer in
pointed contrast to imagining or producing a distribution of wealth
that is more equal or a distribution that is not determined by a
market.    In the case of calls to address disparities of representation,
even less is accomplished—not even wealth inequality is on the
table.  In either case, what’s at stake is at best making neoliberalism
fairer.  At worst, the aim is just to make its cultural production look
more diverse.  Either way, the effect is to justify inequality rather than
to eliminate it.  The neoliberal party within the university, and within
art history speci cally, is committed to this  disparitarian  politics.
  There’s a reason why social justice is a paramount consideration in
the appointment of your next named chair, while it is uncouth to
mention social justice apropos of adjuncts or custodial
contractors.  The preferred species of social justice plays a real role in
disappearing the other.   And globalizing is a version of this
maneuver.
So, what does the globalizing maneuver look like, and how does it
work?
In a recent essay on art history as a taught subject,
Claire Farago  identi es “two urgent questions facing the humanities
today”:  One is the “increasingly corporate university’s administrative
charge to offer majors that have occupational value” (115).      Art
history pays its way, occupational-value-wise, because of “the
museum and related institutions and practices, chie y the
infotainment industry” (115).  Farago cites the introduction she wrote
with Donald Preziosi to a volume of essays, in which they argued that
museums play a special role in “the fabrication and perpetuation of
our conception of  ourselves  as autonomous individuals with unique
subjectivities” (127-28n2).  The museum holds a special place among
society’s “ideological apparatuses” (128n2).  So, on Farago’s view, as
art historians, we’re reproducing ourselves as labor for the corporate
university and museum-infotainment-complex, in order to support an
ideological state apparatus that holds a special place in producing
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subjects (following Althusser, agents with the freedom to make
choices and also a sense of their own subjection to the state  ).  The
 rst of the imperatives  Farago  names indicates that it is not her
purpose to resist the system that reproduces its workers in new
subjects.  “What matters crucially are the values that we instill along
with the subject matter” (115).   Hence the other urgent imperative:
we “need to rethink how we teach at the introductory level”
(115).    Althusser praises certain brave and clear-eyed teachers for
bucking their role in producing subjects for capitalism;  Farago, on
the other hand, wants us to produce subjects with good values
(“Ideology,” 252).  In our view, her plan is well suited to do precisely
that—to produce subjects for capitalism who are fully trained by the
relevant ISA to savor the ethical weight of the choices they can feel
themselves making when they think about other peoples.  This is the
politics of representation at work.    The reference to Althusser just
makes its complicity with capitalism rise to visibility.
Is this just  Farago’s  peculiar self-incriminating mention of
Althusser?  What Farago has done by treating art history as an ISA
and by indicating that globalizing it is a feature, not a bug, of the art
history ISA’s program is to offer a surprisingly apt diagnosis of the
whole impulse to globalizing art history.    So let’s look further and
consider the political function of global art history,
taking Farago’s generally reliable and compact diagnosis of it as our
guide.
To make a concise story short, a few issues
underlie  Farago’s  account.    First, “the history of art has no  a
priori  object domain” (120).    That is to say, it’s not clear which
objects  are our business  and what narratives will emerge from the
choice of objects we make.   The category of art and the categories
that support our organization of its history (“nation-states,
continents, religions, period styles, and other such monolithic entities”
[121]) are neither innocent nor adequate.    Secondly, history, which
we understand to be “a dynamic process that  ows in-between,
outside, intersects with, and otherwise does not conform to our
inherited  subdisciplinary  categories,” requires a rethinking of those
categories (120).  Finally, as a corollary of the  rst two, “truth” must
be understood “as something to be negotiated, to be debated,
something that remains relative and particular, rather than  xed and
universal” (120-21), something “tied to concrete situations and
subject positions” (121).
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The  rst issue implies something as simple as overthrowing “our
inherited nineteenth-century categories” (124)—such as “Art”—and
teaching “all forms of cultural production,” including “song and
dance, poetry, music, storytelling” (122).  This turn to cultural studies
is, in a certain sense, old news.    We all range freely over  elds of
cultural production and practice.    If the twentieth century taught us
anything it is that, ontologically, art status is cheap.    Anyone can
secure it for nearly any artifact or practice, including “song and
dance, poetry, music, storytelling”; indeed, art is a part of ordinary
life and has been for a long time.   Of course, there are signi cant
achievements in the various arts, which one may celebrate with praise
and study.    In order to make art sinister, we have to transform
it.    Then we call it  ne art.    Such art is made by geniuses,
commissioned by kings, discussed by an exclusive cadre of specialists,
and is by its nature ideologically saturated with notions of genius,
political hierarchy, and Eurocentrism, according to a certain well
worn line of reasoning, so we call it “ ne art” or just “Art.”    But
that’s not where the real force of  Farago’s  argument lies, and that
sleight of hand is another topic.    To see the real thrust of
problematizing the category of art (Art), we have to see how it
articulates with the other issues she raises.
So, unsurprisingly, something similar occurs with the second issue:
“Considering the global trading network established in the sixteenth
century in a longer historical context effectively decenters the
dominant role attributed to Europe in the era of colonialism”
(124).  The early modern world’s story is not the story of Europe, so
discourse should “embrace[] the challenge to theorize about the
complexities of cultural interaction without imposing ethnocentric
categories such as those that historically de ne the discipline on
Euro-American terms” (122).  Again, there is nothing shocking here;
furthermore, nothing incompatible with the practice of art history as
we all know it.    One can imagine an art historian working on
artifacts outside modern European discourse wanting to use concepts
and categories the makers of those artifacts used.  One of the good
results of the recent move toward global art history is an increase in
the number of such specialists and commensurate progress in those
 elds of study.    Will the department’s specialist in early modern
Europe really insist, against protests of their irrelevance, that the
new specialist in South Asian art produce a set of stylistic categories
supported by periodizations and national schools?
But to see it that way would be to miss the point again.   Farago  is
clear up front: what we do is political.  That, of course, has been the
premise of this discussion of  Farago’s  essay.    But how
does  Farago  understand her politics?    According to  Farago, citing
Giorgio  Agamben, politics “will no longer be a struggle for the
conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State
and the non-State (humanity).”      Agamben  is pointing to
Tiananmen Square—an infamous clash between protesters and the
state, in which, according to Agamben, the protesters distinguished
their protest by “the relative absence of determinate contents in their
demands” (“Tiananmen,” 68).   Agamben  takes this to be the new
mode of politics, which will oppose itself to the state—the power of
individuals to “form a community without af rming an identity”
(“Tiananmen,” 87).  This might explain why our role in this struggle
is to overcome and to alert our students to the visual rhetorical
strategies that allowed Donald Trump to mislead and deceive the
American public, to make them complicit in his program of racist
xenophobia (118).    This belonging without identity would oppose
racism and xenophobia, which pit members of one identity against
members of another.  And this seems to be a welcome alternative to
multiculturalism, which opposes racism and xenophobia and their
hypostatization of ethnicity as fundamentally mistaken only to
respond with a demand that ethnicity be hypostatized more
af rmatively.    By eschewing identity in favor of belonging as
such, Agamben (and Farago) transcend identity politics by replacing
identities with subjects.
This approach retains the salutary antiracism of traditional identity
politics while continuing to neglect class politics.   A protest without
demands is not a protest against capitalism. Farago’s proposal, then,
is to recognize (correctly) the racist and xenophobic dimensions
of Trumpism (and of right-wing politics of the recent past), but to
implicitly ignore the equally (or more) central place of its neoliberal
economic policies.  This is, like the “relative absence of determinate
contents” that marked the demands of the Tiananmen protestors, a
politics without political objectives.    In a world wracked by the
depredations of capitalism, is a “relative absence of determinate
contents” the right model for our political agenda?  No.
Again: is this  Farago’s  politics, or is this something in the DNA of
global art history?    Insofar as globalization concerns itself with
“subject positions,” it seems clear that struggles for state power and
deep changes to the relations of production and the exploitation of
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labor are not just beyond its grasp but irrelevant to it.   How is this
antipathy to class politics inherent in Farago’s approach?
The key move here is  Farago’s  shift from truth as “ xed and
universal” toward a notion of truth as based on “subject positions”
(121).   Accordingly, “the same object or concrete manifestation can
have multiple meanings for its users,” a point  Farago  takes to be
“timely” precisely because awareness that “works of art and other
cultural artifacts that art historians study are irreducibly multivalent
[…] can enable individuals with different beliefs to coexist in the same
heterogeneous society” (125).    Objects mean different things,
according to  Farago, to different people.    Learning that cultural
artifacts mean what their various users take them to mean is inherent
in Farago’s  politics, according to which heterogeneous humanity
organizes itself around its heterogeneity and does so in pointed
disregard for the variety of its unreconciled “different beliefs.”
This move is familiar.  And not just because Trump and people like
him insist that other people (whatever that means) are irreducibly
different from us (whatever that means).  Even when a right-thinking
liberal like  Farago  does it, replacing meaning with identity and
disagreement with difference is a profoundly ideological tendency
and one that is fundamental to recent history’s nearly invisible
acquiescence to neoliberalism.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the
notion that we have no universal issues (history) to debate, but have
instead separate experiences (histories) to recognize, has meant the
displacement of objective issues such as exploitation by subjective
concerns like recognition.
So this is how Farago’s argument works.   And this is the inevitable
logic of globalization as a cause in the humanities.  The status of the
work of art is called into question.    This takes a particular
form.    Rather than recognizing the ontological generosity of the
category of art, the argument demands a critique of the category as
such.   With that questioning comes a critique of the very notion of
categories as a universalist legacy of European domination; rather
than turn to a historicism that multiplies contexts, discourses, and
therefore categories, the argument requires that meaning be
relativized, freed from contexts, discourses, and categories
altogether.  This entails a suspension of truth claims, so that subject
position displaces meaning (not what something means to me, or
means to someone), and difference trumps disagreement.    So we
arrive at a politics of subject positions as against a politics of
class.  We stand before the state’s tanks without an analysis of history
or of exploitation; without solidarity grounded in demands.    Who
could ask for a better subject?
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NOTES
  For more on these issues, see nonsite.org 23 “Naturalizing Class Relations,” led by Kenneth
Warren’s “Tain’t So.” https://nonsite.org/issues/issue-23-naturalizing-class-relations
  Claire Farago, “Imagining Art History Otherwise,” in Jane Chin Davidson and Sandra
Esslinger, eds., Global and World Art in the Practice of the University Museum (New York:
Routledge, 2017), 115-30; here citing 115.
  Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward an
Investigation),” trans. Ben Brewster, appendix two in On the Reproduction of Capitalism:
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, pref. Etienne Balibar, intro. Jacques Bidet, trans.
G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014), 232-272, speci cally 269; translation originally
published in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster
(London: New Left Books, 1971).
  “Imagining,” 118; quoting Giorgio Agamben, “Tiananmen” in The Coming Community,
trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 86.
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